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STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon an appellate court by the 
Appellant1s filing of a timely and sufficient notice of Appeal. 
The fundamental and initial inquiry of a court is always to 
determine its jurisdictional authority over the subject matter of 
the claims. When a court determines that it lacks jurisdiction, 
its authority extends no further than to dismiss the action. See 
e.g. Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah App. 1987). 
The threshold issue which must be resolved by this Court is 
whether or not the Appellant's failure to identify the specific 
Appellees against whom this appeal is brought in the Appellant's 
Notice of Appeal, identifying them only as "et al.", deprives the 
Court of appellate jurisdiction over claims brought against those 
parties who are not specifically identified. See e.g. Torres v* 
Oakland Scavenger Co., 108 S.Ct 2405 (1988)(notice of appeal that 
failed to specifically identify one plaintiff was insufficient to 
confer jurisdiction on a Court of Appeals). 
Although the Torres case involves the failure of a plaintiff 
to identify a plaintiff, not a failure to identify all defendants 
with specificity, the Defendants allege that the reasoning in the 
Torres case also deprives this Court of appellate jurisdiction to 
consider Plaintiff's appeal insofar as it concerns the defendants 
who were not specifically named in Plaintiff's Notice of Appeal, 
but who were only identified under the rubric of "et al." Id. at 
v 
page 2409. See Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure 3 and 4. Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
See also Graves v. Raypak, Inc., 891 F.2d 254 (10th Cir 1989). 
Although the cited cases were based upon the interpretation 
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, use of the term "et 
al." in the heading of the Appellantfs Notice of Appeal fails to 
provide sufficient notice to those referred to as flet al." That 
term is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on courts as to those 
not identified with specificity in the notice of appeal. 
While this issue is one of first impression for this Court, 
it has great significance for this appeal because if this Court 
lacks jurisdiction over the other two commissioners, injunctive 
relief granted only against Jimmie N. Reidhead alone would not be 
effective against the Uintah County Commission. Also, absence of 
jurisdiction over all unnamed Defendants simplifies resolution of 
all other issues. See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 108 S.Ct 
2405, 2409 (1988)("et al.," which literally means "and others," 
fails to provide such notice to the opposition or the court). 
Therefore, all Defendants below, except Jimmie N. Reidhead, 
respectfully request this Court to rule that Plaintifffs failure 
to identify the Defendants, except for Jimmie N. Reidhead, beyond 
the "et al." designation deprives this Court of jurisdiction of 
this appeal as to them, both for issues otherwise properly raised 
and for issues not adequate raised before the court below. 
vi 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL 
1. Whether this Court lacks jurisdiction over all of 
the named Defendants except Jimmie N. Reidhead. 
2. Whether Defendant Uintah County Commissioners were 
entitled to the Summary Judgment entered by the District Court as 
a matter of law on Plaintiff's claim for personal damages against 
the County Commissioners in their individual capacities where the 
Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to show the existence 
of fraud, collusion or bad faith. 
3. Issues that are not adequately raised before the 
district court are waived. 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Statutes 
1. Section 17-5-12, Moneys unlawfully pad — Recover — 
Restraining payment, Utah Code Ann. 1953: 
Whenever any board of county commissioners shall 
without authority of law order any money paid for 
any purpose and such money shall have been actual-
ly paid, or whenever any other county officer has 
drawn any warrant in own his favor or in favor of 
any other person without being authorized thereto 
by the board of county commissioners or by law and 
the same shall have been paid, the county attorney 
of such county shall institute suit in the name of 
the county against such person or such officer and 
his official bondsman to recover the money so paid, 
and when the money has not been paid on such order 
or warrants, the county attorney of such county upon 
receiving notice thereof shall commence suit in the 
name of the county to restrain the payment of the 
same; no order of the board of county commissioners 
shall be necessary in order to maintain either of 
such actions. 
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2. Section 17-5-16(3), Books to be kept, Utah Code Ann. 
1953 provides: The board must cause to be kept: 
(3) A road book, containing all proceedings and 
adjudication relating to the establishment, 
maintenance, care and discontinuance of 
roads and road districts, and all contracts 
and other matters pertaining thereto. 
3. Section 27-12-89, Public use constituting dedication, 
Utah Code Ann. 1963, provides: 
A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and 
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been 
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a per-
iod of ten years. 
4. Section 27-15-3, Maps to be prepared by county -- In-
dication of roads, Utah Code Ann. 1978, provides: 
(1) Each county shall prepare maps showing to the 
best of its ability the roads within its boundaries 
which were in existence as of October 21, 1976. Pre-
paration of these maps may be done by the county it-
self or through any multi-county planning district in 
which the county participates. A county shall be given 
a minimum of two years to complete mapping of the roads 
within its boundaries. 
(2) Any road which is established or constructed after 
October 21, 1976, shall similarly be reflected on the 
maps prepared as provided in Subsection (1). 
(3) Upon completion of any map provided for under 
either Subsection (1) or Subsection (2) the county 
shall provide a copy of it to the Department of 
Transportation. This department shall scribe each 
road shown on this map on its own county map series 
but shall not be responsible for the validity of any 
such road nor its being inventoried. The department 
shall also keep on file an historical map record of 
the road as so provided by the counties. 
viii 
5. Section 52-4-1, Declaration of public policy, Utah Code 
Annotated 1977, provides: 
In enacting this chapter, the Legislature finds and 
declares that the state, its agencies and political 
subdivisions, exist to aid in the conduct of the 
people's business. It is the intent of the law that 
their actions be taken openly and that their delib-
erations be conducted openly. 
6. Section 52-4-2, Definitions, Utah Code Annotated 1987, 
provides: 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Meeting" means the convening of a public body, 
with a quorum present, whether in person or by means 
of electronic equipment, for the purpose of discuss-
ing or acting upon a matter over which the public body 
has jurisdiction or advisory power. This chapter shall 
not apply to chance meetings. "Convening," as used in 
this subsection, means the calling of a meeting of a 
public body by a person or persons authorized to do so 
for the express purpose of discussing or acting upon a 
subject over which that public body has jurisdiction. 
(2) "Public body" means any administrative, advisory, 
executive, or legislative body of the state or its 
political subdivisions which consists of two or more 
persons that expends, disburses, or is supported in 
whole or in part by tax revenue and which is vested 
with the authority to make decisions regarding the 
publicfs business. "Public body" does not include 
any political party, group, or caucus nor any con-
ference committee, rules or sifting committee of the 
Legislature. 
(3) "Quorum" means a simple majority of the membership 
of a public body, unless otherwise defined by applic-
able law, but a quorum does not include a meeting of 
two elected officials by themselves when no action, 
either formal or informal, is taken on a subject over 
which these elected officials have jurisdiction. 
ix 
7. Section 52-4-3, Meetings open to the public — Except-
ions , Utah Code Annotated 1977, provides: 
Every meeting is open to the public unless closed 
pursuant to Sections 52-4-4 and 52-4-5. 
8. Section 52-4-4, Closed meeting held upon vote of 
membership -- Business -- Reasons for meetings 
recorded, Utah Code Annotated 1977, provides: 
A closed meeting may be held upon the affirmative vote 
of two-thirds of the members of the public body present 
at an open meeting for which notice is given pursuant 
to Section 52-4-6; provided a quorum is present. No 
closed meeting is allowed except as to matters exempted 
under Section 52-4-5; provided, no ordinance, resolu-
tion, rule, regulation, contract, or appointment shall 
be approved at a closed meeting. The reason or reasons 
for holding a closed meeting and the vote, either for 
or against the proposition to hold such a meeting, cast 
by each member by name shall be entered on the minutes 
of the meeting. Nothing in this chapter shall be con-
strued to require that any meeting be closed to the 
public. 
9. Section 52-4-5, Purposes of closed meetings ~ Chance 
meetings and social meetings excluded — Disruption of 
meetings, Utah Code Annotated 1977, provides: 
(1) A closed meeting may be held pursuant to Section 
52-4-4 for any of the following purposes: 
(a) discussion of the character, professional 
competence, or physical or mental health of an 
individual; 
(b) strategy sessions with respect to collective 
bargaining, litigation, or purchase of real prop-
erty; 
(c) discussion regarding deployment of security 
personnel or devices; and 
(d) investigative proceedings regarding allega-
tions of criminal misconduct. 
x 
(2) This chapter shall not apply to any chance meeting 
or social meeting. No chance meeting or social meeting 
shall be used to circumvent this chapter. 
(3) This chapter shall not prohibit the removal of any 
person who willfully disrupts a meeting to the extent 
that orderly conduct is seriously compromised. 
Section 52-4-6, Public notice of meetings, Utah Code 
Annotated 1978, provides: 
(1) Any public body which holds regular public meetings 
that are scheduled in advance over the course of a year 
shall give public notice at least once each year of its 
annual meeting schedule as provided in this section. 
The public notice shall specify the date, time, and 
place of such meetings. 
(2) In addition to the notice requirements of Subsec-
tion (1) of this section, each public body shall give 
not less than 24 hours public notice of the agenda, 
date, time, and place of its meetings. 
(3) Public notice shall be satisfied by: 
(a) posting written notice at the principal office 
of the public body, or if no such office exists, 
at the building where the public meeting is to be 
held; and 
(b) providing notice to at least one newspaper of 
general circulation within the geographic juris-
diction of the public body, or to a local media 
correspondent. 
(4) When because of unforseen circumstances it is 
necessary for a public body to hold an emergency 
meeting to consider matters of an emergency or urgent 
nature, the notice requirements of Section 52-4-6(2) 
may be disregarded and the best notice practicable 
given. No such emergency meeting of a public body 
shall be held unless an attempt has been made to 
notify all of its members and a majority votes in 
the affirmative to hold the meeting. 
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Section 52-4-7, Minutes of open meetings — Public meet-
ings — Recording of meetings, Utah Code Annotated 1978: 
(1) Written minutes of all open meetings. Such 
minutes shall include: 
(a) the date, time, and place of the meeting; 
(b) the names of members present and absent; 
(c) the substance of all matters proposed, dis-
cussed, or decided, and a record, by individual 
member, of votes taken; 
(d) the names of all citizens who appeared and 
the substance in brief of their testimony; 
(e) any other information that any member re-
quests be entered into the minutes. 
(2) Written meetings shall be kept of all closed 
meetings. Such minutes shall include: 
(a) the date, time and place of the meeting; 
(b) the names of members present and absent; 
(c) names of all others present except where 
such disclosure would infringe on the confi-
dence necessary to fulfill the original pur-
pose of closing the meeting. 
(3) The minutes are public records and shall be avail-
able within a reasonable time after the meeting. 
(4) All or part of an open meeting may be recorded by 
any person in attendance; provided, the recording does 
not interfere with the conduct of the meeting. 
Section 52-4-8, Suit to avoid final action — Limita-
tion — Exceptions, Utah Code Annotated 1978, provides: 
Any final action taken in violation of Sections 52-4-3 
and 52-4-6 is voidable by a court of competent juris-
diction. Suit to void final action shall be commenced 
within 90 days after the action except that with re-
spect to any final action concerning the issuance of 
bonds, notes, or other evidences of indebtedness suit 
shall be commenced within 30 days after the action. 
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13. Section 42-4-9, Enforcement of chapter — Suit to com-
pel compliance, Utah Code Annotated 1977, provides: 
(1) The attorney general and county attorneys of the 
state shall enforce this chapter. 
(2) A person denied any right under this chapter may 
commence suit in a court of competent jurisdiction to 
compel compliance or enjoin violations of this chapter 
or to determine its applicability to discussions or 
decisions of a public body. The court may award rea-
sonable attorney fees and court costs to a successful 
plaintiff. 
Rules 
1. Rule 3(c) and 3(d), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
3(c) Designation of the parties. The party taking the 
appeal shall be known as the appellant and the adverse 
party as the appellee. The title of the action or pro-
ceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the ap-
peal, except where otherwise directed by the appellate 
court. In original proceedings in the appellate court, 
the party making the original application shall be known 
as the petitioner and the other party as the respondent. 
3(d) Content of the notice of appeal. The notice of ap-
peal shall specify the party or parties taking the ap-
peal; shall designate the judgment or order, or part 
thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from 
which the appeal is taken; and shall designate the court 
to which the appeal is taken. 
2. Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in applicable 
part, provides: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers, interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to a 
judgement as a matter of law. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was brought by Alvin G. Nash, the Uintah County 
Attorney, against the individual members of the Uintah Board of 
County Commissioners pursuant to Section 17-5-12, Utah Code An-
notated 1953, to recover funds allegedly spent by the members of 
that board without authority of law. See Plaintiff's Complaint. 
The damages for which the County Attorney sought recovery 
was alleged to be an amount in excess of $20,000.00 for paving 
the road that he described as a "private driveway" leading up to 
Commissioner Reidhead's home. The County Attorney also sought to 
enjoin the Defendants from spending any further County moneys on 
the road for construction or maintenance. 
In response to those allegations, the County Commissioners1 
Answer denied that any public monies were spent to pave a private 
driveway and that the roadway at issue is a dedicated road under 
several legal theories and that the County Attorneyfs stipulation 
in a closely related case is also dispositive of this case. 
Defendants have taken the position that virtually everyone, 
including the purported owner of the road, except Uintah County 
Attorney Alvin Nash, have taken the position that the road is a 
County road entitled to state road funds. Even if Commissioner 
Reidhead did not realize that he had any ownership rights in the 
road when the Commission decided to pave the road, his continued 
insistence that the road is a County road during the pendency of 
1 
this action would constitute a clear acceptance of the previous 
designation of the road as a County road (offer to make the road 
a County road) sufficient to allow the Court to determine that a 
dedication had been made. 
This case is unique in its allegation that the cost of the 
paving an undedicated road should be recovered from individual 
members of county commissions. The County Attorney's action is 
based on a theory that any unauthorized paving of an undedicated 
road is illegal, see Complaint at paragraph 6. Ownership of the 
underlying right of way required for the roadway is not disputed 
by any purported landowner. Instead the County Attorney seeks to 
recover personal damages against individual members of the county 
commission. While the prayer of the Complaint sought injunctive 
relief, that issue was not adequately raised before the Court nor 
aggressively pursued by the County Attorney during the proceedings 
on the Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion. 
The allegations made by the County Attorney, if valid, have 
far reaching implications. At issue is what amount of proof must 
be plead by the County Attorney to show that the conduct of the 
Board of County Commissioners is unlawful. Where, as here, proof 
of ownership of county roads has not traditionally been through 
proof of formal dedication of public roads, actions by a County 
Attorney to invalidate decisions by the County Commissioners are 
inherently suspect, absent sufficient proof of unlawfulness. 
2 
When this case was initially brought by the Uintah County 
Attorney, the Uintah County Commissioners were not willing to 
allow County road crews to continue paving any roads within the 
County because almost all County roads are undedicated or are 
dedicated through the action of law. See e.g. Section 27-12-89, 
Utah Code Ann. 1963. The resulting layoffs prompted the Uintah 
County Road Crew employees to threaten to file a federal civil 
rights action against Uintah County. The Uintah County Attorney 
and the Uintah County Commissioners entered into a stipulation 
agreeing to allow Uintah County Road crew employees to work on 
any County road except the road disputed in this action without 
fear of any additional legal action by the County Attorney. 
The outcome of this litigation is critical to the interests 
of the County Commission because a high percentage of the roads 
that are platted as county roads have not been formally dedicated 
and extensive legal research and numerous declaratory actions may 
be required if the County Attorneyfs mere allegation that a road 
is undedicated is sufficient to require the County Commission to 
prove actual dedication in order to avoid a threatened imposition 
of personal liability for paving such roads. 
Defendant Uintah County Commissioners filed their Motion for 
Summary Judgment, requesting the District Court to enter an Order 
dismissing Plaintiff's action for failure to state any claim upon 
which relief should be granted. Defendants argued that personal 
3 
damages could not be obtained from them or the bondsman without 
alleging sul ficlent facts to show that they acted in bad Oiit.h, 
with fraud, or with corruption. Snyder M M m U i ^ bli I f'.Zd 64 
(Utah 1984) and Spruell Snyder, 693 P.2d 66 (Utah 1984 (jmbl i c 
officials acta i ig wi thi i scope of their official duties cannot 
be held personably liable absent the allegal i»»n aii«) proof of IMII 
faith, Craii< I, OJ. corruption). Government officials are entitled 
to the presumption of honesty ..- : ••<.-*. •; official 
actions. The County Attorney had the burde .... ., IG 
Commi'j.si.uii"". f- artp-l in - faith, with fraud, or with corruption. 
Although the County Attorney )M<] tin- fnjhl tu fian;e access to 
the County's records, Alvin G. Nash sought discovery, taking four 
depositions pri or to the heard i ig oi i e Commissioners 1 Motion inv 
Summary Judgment, See depositions i; * ^  •:; 
Blgelow; l\ „ Glen McKee; and Paul S. Feltch. At: the hearing, the 
argument before the . • . focused on whether Plaintifl '^  
Complaint sufficiently alleged "bad faith" against the iiid i vi I iidL 
"t vunt y Conimi csionot'?.;
 ( noi. on availability of injunctive relief. 
The matter was heard . . .-. ' w e Jud«]e Dennis 
u. Draney, who rendered Summary Judgment . favor of Defendaiits. 
As clearly LDusLraLod by lite transcript -j t ae District Court's 
Ruling attached to the Appellant's uuekiHimj H La Lumen'..
 ( »1io court 
luund that Plaintiff plead insufficient facts to plead bad faith; 
and that, even if Mr ReixIheai'J ot any other County Commissioner 
4 
was benefitted by the decision to pave a roadway is not wrong as 
long as their action was taken in good faith, without fraud and 
without corruption; and granted summary judgment for defendants 
as a matter of law. The Court held that the Commissioners had 
acted in good faith and that it was unnecessary to rule on the 
question of whether or not the road was dedicated. Judgement 
thereon was entered on June 4, 1990. From that Judgement# the 
Plaintiff/Appellant has appealed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are detailed in the four depositions taken by the 
County Attorney and reviewed in depth by the District Court. The 
facts include, but ar not limited to the following: 
1. The road at dispute is part of a roadway that once ran 
completely through what is now the Reidhead property in Bennett, 
West Uintah County, State of Utah. Reidhead deposition, page 3; 
Bigelow deposition at page 10 to 11; Feltch deposition at page 4. 
2. Jimmie N. Reidhead, a Uintah County Commissioner at the 
time the disputed road was paved, owns the property on the east 
side of the road. There's an Indian fort on the West side of the 
road and an Indian owns the first quarter mile and Reidhead owns 
the rest. Reidhead deposition at page 4. 
3. The entire roadway was used as a public roadway as early 
as 1904 and was later used by Indians to travel back and forth to 
the Sundance. Reidhead Deposition at page 6. 
5 
4. riii I :/f I. In: original road hus been abandoned througl i non 
use by the public and is now pail, ol the Reidhead propei i y ihmt 
portion is bounded on both sides by old fencing and is covered by 
weeds and grasses Tin*1 nthor.' r\u] of MM> road is a paved County 
road that connects and intersects with other County roads, Tlio 
disputed section is between the paved section and the part, that 
is no longer a roadway, fico nonei;a'l 1 y Reidhead deposition. 
•< disputed section of the road is a graveled road that; 
'_•• : • feet and lnnq thai runs from the paved part 
: «-' County road j,... the Reidhead"" ;-; huust.-. Nu uUiOf ln»usof, aio 
located o< the portion of the road thai was recently paved. See 
*-.•- * , . i t i o n t\\ p a q o /I •• 4 . ' • ^  ' 
'- roadway has long been listed as a county road «"ii I he 
county and state maps. See Section 27-15-3r Utah Code Ann. 1978, 
requir. r a J ] County roads which 
were , existence as cd j 0/21/76. See the affidavits attached, to 
: > f*> lorion LUJ. Summary Judgment See Feltch deposition 
poo** , JQ-7-7 T c: e a r l J t » * • * r o a d a s i.'oant\ t o a d ) . 
iraveled by Gene Nyberg, then Uintah County 
- * Jimmie Reidhead became a Uintah County 
Commissioner and was part of a much larger graveling projoci - I>ee 
Reidhead depositior rage 7; and Feltch deposition at page 26. 
H, i"he desi.'- . - of" the road as Class "B" or County road 
was made by previous members of the Uintah County i:oiitiiiisi;.i on on 
August 9, 1982. The current County Commissioners, named in this 
6 
action, relied upon the plat map of County, or Class B, roads to 
determine that the road at issue herein was a County road and was 
entitled to be paved with state Class B road monies. See Reidhead 
deposition commencing at page 15 and McKee deposition at page 10. 
9. The disputed road gravel section of the road has been 
treated as a County road for all purposes for years, including 
graveling, snow plowing and placement of county road signs. See 
Reidhead deposition at pages 19 through 23; Bigelow deposition at 
pages 14-15; McKee deposition at page 12-13 and 14; Feltch depo-
sition at page 19, and 22-23. 
10. The County Commission determines where road funds should 
be spent. Feltch deposition at page 15. 
11. The decision to pave the disputed roadway was made by 
the Uintah County Commission at a public road meeting held in 
June of 1989. Reidhead deposition at page 8. 
12. The Uintah County Commissioners were all aware of the 
potential political implications of their decision to pave the 
roadway leading to the Reidhead home and went to extra effort to 
ensure that the decision was justified. See Bigelow deposition 
at pages 5-7, 13 and 19-20. 
13. The Uintah County Road Superintendent, Paul S. Feltch, 
estimated that the cost of paving the road would be less that 
$20#000.00. Reidhead deposition at page 9; Feltch deposition 
at page 6 (cost estimate for matericils a little over $6,000.00). 
7 
Rather than making the paving of the roadway a special 
project, other road paved during the same 
time period. See Reidhead deposition ui.
 ± a-je 19; lUyelow deposi-
tion at pages ? to 8; Feltch deposition . page 21, 26-27 and * ] , 
15. Following their ir;* •
 r-. membors of the Uintah 
County Commission voted unanimously u; :jne 26, 1989 to pave the 
roadway lead:! i lg up to the Reidhead house. Bigelow deposition at 
page 13; Feltch deposition at page 4 
.1 0 " disputed road was paved over a four day period i n 
late August and edL'Ly UeptumJnM <>l 1 *)H9• Feltch deposition at 
page / 
I he Uintah County Attorney, as i he legal advisor to the 
board ,:,£ county commissions i,., i:; i.espuii\l tile io provide legal 
advice to the Uintah County Commission regarding the requirements 
oi the law,, including statutory requirements like the roadbooks 
and the Open Meetings Act, but County At, I oi ney AJvin <J. N.ish did 
not provide such advice commissioners about those matters 
priui I i hi/; IL fci • * -tioi i against the Uintah County 
Commissioners. -:^ Section - ^ / Utah (lode Aunutatiid 14?> l , 
Bigelow deposition «^ ^agc * McKee deposition at page y. 
SUMMARY oi- ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff's failure to identify the Defendants, pxcepl f r 
Defendant Jimmie « Reidhead, deprives this Court i appellate 
jurisdiction over .- Defendants t?i{c*;."|4 |nr Re i-.- I uat 
is so, any injunction entered against Reidhead alone would not 
be effective to control the behavior of the other Commissioners, 
The County Attorney had the burden to sufficiently allege 
and prove that the County Commissioners acted in bad faith# with 
fraud or corruption. The allegations that the road was a private 
driveway and that the roadway only led to the Reidhead home were 
insufficient to allege bad faith. The County Attorney failed to 
allege either fraud or corruption. The County Commissioners are 
the government body to decide how County moneys should be spent. 
The statute providing the County Attorney power to sue the Board 
of County Commissioners for any unlawful expenditures places the 
burden on the County Attorney to show that the expenditures were 
unlawful. Absent allegations and proof that the Commissioner's 
actions occurred in bad faith, with fraud, or with corruption, 
the individual Commissioners cannot be held personally liable for 
their decisions. 
Finally, the County Attorney did not allege any further 
facts that were sufficient to show that the actions of County 
Commissioners were unlawful or that could support imposition of 
a judicial injunction of construction or maintenance of the road. 
The Plaintiff failed to adequately raise the issues of injunctive 
relief, whether pursuant to Section 17-5-12 or to the Utah Open 
Meetings Act, Section 52-4-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated 1977. 
Instead of providing necessary legal advice to the Uintah County 
9 
Coiiiiulijsj om?i s „ tin-1 Cminly Attorney immediately chose t o t ake the 
adversarial posture in this action that may null have oUherwi.se 
become necessary if he had first carried out his duty to advise 
Iht: bitatd «i( fmnil i1 i\mm iss i OIKM r» and had reserved the judicial 
mechanism afforded by Section 17-5-12, Utah Code Ann. IHVJ,., 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I -EXCEPT FOR 11R KKIDHKAl), THJLU COURT HA"/ LACK J URISDICTION 
If Plaintiff's failure to identify all ot the Defendants in 
the N'cr - ' Appeal deprives the Court of appellate jurisdiction 
over t issues raised by liaintilf uii appeal, ihi.s Cum * :; 1 HM»i11 
uphold the decision .Judge Draney dismissing the Complaint as 
a mat tei; of law as tu Deteiiditiit Reidhead for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted. Any injunctive relief, 
whether pursuant to Section 17-5-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
or to Sections bl- »de Annotated 1970, and 42-4-9, 
Utah Code Annotated 1977, would be ineffective against a single 
fount y CommLss i oner. ' ' • 
POINT II DEFENDANT UINTAH COUNTY COMMISSIONERS WERE ENTITLED TO 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW ON THE PLAINTIFF'S 
CLAIM FOR PERSONAL DAMAGES AGAINST INDIVIDUAL COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS WHERE THE COURT HELD THAT PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT FAILED TO ALLEGE SUFFICIENT FACTS TO SHOW 
FRAUD, COLLUSION OR BAD FAITH 
This case is about wlip determines which roads are pubiio and 
therefore entitled to be paved, and iiai i itained at public expense* 
T^ie county Attorney alleges that County Commissioners1 conduct in 
authorizing paving of tl :ie i oad lead :i i ig t: o Commi ssi oner Reidhead's 
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residence was unlawful because the road is not dedicated and that 
the road is Commissioner Reidheadfs private driveway. 
County records and maps and the records of the Utah State 
Department of Transportation indicated that the disputed roadway 
was a Uintah County road. The County Commissioners had the right 
to rely on those official maps. 
The fact that the County prepared and filed a plat map that 
showed the disputed road as a Class B County road for the purpose 
of obtaining road construction funds, without some evidence that 
the owner intended to dedicate., is insufficient to prove a valid 
dedication. Automotive Products Corp. v. Provo City Corp., 502 
P.2d 568, 569 (Utah 1972). However, absent bad faith, fraud, or 
collusion on the part of the decisionmakers, the designate a road 
as a Class "B" or County road is valid against anyone except the 
landowner or a bona fide purchaser from the landowner. The only 
person with standing to challenge the validity of the designation 
of the road as a Class "B" County road was the owner. Purported 
owner Jimmie N. Reidhead does not dispute the Countyfs ownership. 
And if Commissioner Reidhead was aware that roadway was his 
property, his pecuniary interest could be found sufficient to 
constitute a conflict of interest that would invalidate his vote, 
but absent facts sufficient to invalidate the other Commissioners 
votes, the remaining Commissioners1 votes would be sufficient to 
authorize the paving of a road previously designated as a County 
11 
roa s tiueil Inferring acceptance of 
the prior Commission ., designation f^fi \ make » uad a county 
road) through Reidhead fs assent to the paving. 
The Counties ai v pul L t i va 1 subdivisions of the state* whoso 
creation, powers and duties are derived from the constiti itioi i and 
i xaw. xu x^ » . function of the County Commission 
to govern - County as to I - \fare 
and good order and to carry <n various activities and i« i »s ovide 
those- pnhlxc services usually considered to be the responsibility 
of a county government. Its powers include powers speed fi ca 1 3 y 
enunciated by law and powers reasonably and necessarily implied 
io I'tiiiy mil tin; in lospnnsibilities. In connection therewith i t: 
acts as the legislative body for the Co . ; 
duties acts as an executive in administering county affairs, in 
order * - dischattjo those i oiiponslbj !l ; * '•• '•• an effective manner, 
If. must necessarily be allowed reasonable latitude or discretion* 
Cottonwood CJ ty Elec. v. Salt Lake ~^. _^, -I Com"rs, 499 P.2d 
270 (Utah 1972), 
The determination t*~ " f constitutes n public purpose is 
M b egislatxve iunction, subject «• review >t urts 
when abused <A:\-.\ ;-;° "legislative body :, it 
matter should J e reversed except t instances where such 
ci-.Mirnaiui ...;,, ,^:: ifestly arbitrcu *> d incorrect. 
Wagner • \ ) * unt- * i •'• v . : -"-ad 1IH1""" (Ut.«v, - ^) • 
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In conformity with the basic rule respecting the division 
of powers of government, this Court should not interfere with 
the actions of the Commission unless it appears that it acted 
beyond its authority, or acted in some manner which is clearly 
contrary to law, or acted without reason so that its action must 
be deemed arbitrary or capricious. Cottonwood City Electors v. 
Salt Lake Co. Bd. of Comfrs, 499 P.2d 270, 272 (Utah 1972). 
County Commissions are empowered to acquire rights of way 
for county roads, see Section 17-5-38, Ut. Code Ann. (as amended 
1983); and to help to determine which roads are the Class lfB" or 
County roads in order to obtain state road construction money, 
see Sections 27-12-22 U.C.A. 1967 and 27-12-108.1 U.C.A. 1983. 
One method of acquiring such rights of way is by dedication. 
A dedication, like any other contract, consists of an offer and 
acceptance. A dedication without acceptance is, in law, merely 
an offer to dedicate. Until acceptance the public acquires no 
rights, and is subject to no duties. When a dedication is made 
and accepted a public highway is created. Mason v. State, 656 
P.2d 465 (Utah 1982), particularly the concurring opinion by 
Justice Howe commencing on page 470 thereof. 
Dedication can be evidenced by an explicit offer by a land-
owner and explicit acceptance by the governmental entity. See 
Section 57-5-4 U.C.A. 1953 (subdivision map/plat operates as a 
public dedication to all streets, alleys, and public places). 
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Dedicati oi i may also be implied. Such an implied dedication 
must be based upon the intention of the landowner ,  w ~>o 
shown by words, acts, or deeds of the owner which might. < . ~a, r 
manifest an intention to dedicate. Automotive Products Corp. v. 
Provo City Corp. , 502 P. 2d 568, 569 (I Jtal: I 1 9 72) K y, Sect Inn 
27-12-89f U.C.A. 1,96! (highway deemed to have been dedicated and 
abandoned in inn use m b ] ;:i c whei i :I t i s used continual ] y as 
a public thoroughfare public use for a period of ten years). But 
implied dedications normally result in a dedication of the i: i ght 
of way, subject to the ownerf s rever si 02 lar y i 1 iterest ai id r i ght to 
use the road in a manner not inconsistent with public use. 
Add i L iujial Ly, the other defenses stated in the motion, i.e. 
the uncontested public use of the roadway ay a public toad s i m v 
1917 and the inherent unfairness of allowing the County Attorney 
to si, Lpulat »•» tn i in* pavjiKj and maintenance of all other County 
Roads while continuing to maintain this action based upon the 
allegations that paving the road was unlawful because the road 
was undedicated, should also pjewiiiil 1J1.11 u 1 i f I Itoiii pi eva 11 ,1 nq 
in this action. 
The law is d e a r ly established i n the State of Utah that, :1 11 
order to prevail ™ c n ^ * claim, - Cc >ui ity Attor 1 ley in 1st: a 1 1 ege 
sufficient facts u; : i« , . • - expenditure of funds by Coi inty 
Commissione .rs was - uiie acts of the Commissioners 
constituted bad faith, fraud or corruption. Snydej »>• M m k l n y , 
] 4 
693 P.2d 64 (Utah 1984) and Spruell v. Snyder, 693 P.2d 66 (Utah 
1984)(public officials acting within the scope of their official 
duties cannot be held personably liable absent an allegation and 
proof of bad faith, fraud, or corruption). 
Although Plaintiff has alleged that the roadway at issue is 
a private driveway, the location of Commissioner Reidhead's home 
at the end of the county road is insufficient to constitute bad 
faith, fraud, or corruption. Absent a showing that the other two 
Commissioners were aware that the road had not been dedicated, or 
that their conduct constituted bad faith, fraud, or corruption, 
those Commissioners are entitled to a presumption of honesty and 
integrity for their official actions. Snyder v. Merkley, supra.; 
Spruell v. Snyder, supra.; and Withrow v. Larkin, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 
1464 (1975). That presumption entitles these commissioners to 
public official immunity for their actions in this matter. 
Where, as here, the Complaint fails to plead adequate facts 
to justify either damages or injunctive relief, the Court should 
uphold the District Courtfs Summary Judgment Order and dismiss 
the Plaintiff/Appellantfs appeal. 
POINT III ISSUES INADEQUATELY RAISED BEFORE THE COURT ARE WAIVED 
In Utah, matters not raised in the pleadings or put at issue 
at the trial may not be raised for the first time on Appeal. The 
matter is sufficiently raised if submitted to the trial court and 
the trial court has had an opportunity to make findings of fact 
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or 1 aw. Them U'M m L-.^UOI which are neither apparent no. wh. -* 
are reasonably ascertainable from the pleading:-. 
exhibits wi 1 ,1 not be considered Even II the inegations : ; . 
Plaintifffs pleadiiigs are generously inlnrpreted, any allegation 
not supported hy a factual showing or by f lie submission of loyal 
authoiity io not, presented for decision Further, the rule that 
a legal theory may not be raised x _s 
"stringently applied when the new theory depends on controverted 
farnidJ. questions whose* relevance thereto was not iiadei to appear 
at trial." See James v» Preston, 7 4'»/> )" ;,*l 'U9, 'MM int-'!- A|>f». 
1987)(citations omitted). 
Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose is the final 
settlement of controversies, requires thai a party must 
present his entire case and his theory or theories for 
recovery to the trial court; and having done so, he can-
not thereafter change to some different theory and thus 
attempt to keep in motion a merry-go-round of ] itigation, 
Huruiy " t Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984), 
citing Simpson v. General Motors Corp. , <*/u 
P.2d -<-• (Utah 1970). 
applicable when UA« issue 3 raised ! ^  :he 
filing of a motion for summary judgment. ? • r, 731 
P.2d - (Utah 1986) (issue not raised the pleadings <i*.,1 
not addressed Jhy I ho tt'ic1"! ruurL wa.\; not xuied on in the appeal 
of that motion for summary judgment). 
Neither the Appellant's docketing statement, nor the record, 
support the tact or any utt vrvnee ttia1. Plaintiff ever pressed the 
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issue of injunctive relief past the Complaint's prayer for relief 
or for an injunction based on alleged violations of the Utah Open 
Meeting Act. Goodman v. Wilkinson, 629 P.2d 47 (Utah 1981). 
Instead of providing necessary legal advice to the County 
Commissioners, the County Attorney immediately chose to take the 
adversarial posture in this action that may not have otherwise 
become necessary if he had first carried out his duty to advise 
the board of county commissioners and had reserved the judicial 
mechanism afforded by Section 17-5-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
No adequate grounds for either damages or injunctive relief were 
stated in Plaintiff's Complaint and none should be granted now. 
Where materials presented by the moving party are sufficient 
to entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law and the opposing 
party fails either to offer counter-affidavits or other materials 
that raise a credible issue of fact to show that he has evidence 
not then available, the summary judgment may be rendered for the 
moving party. See e.g. Schaer v. State by and through Utah Dept. 
of Transportation, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983). 
CONCLUSION 
Summary Judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, 
affidavits and admissions show that there is no genuine issue 
of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to the 
requested judgment as a matter of law. Where, as here, there 
is no reasonable probability that the Plaintiff could prevail 
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in this matter, this Court should grant summary judgment. See 
Snyder v. Merkley, 693 P.2d 64 (Utah 1984). 
Based upon the foregoing reasoning, this Court should deny 
Appellant's Appeal. The material facts are not in dispute, and 
these Defendants were entitled to the judgment on the pleadings 
and dismissal granted by the Court in their favor based upon the 
grounds discussed herein. 
Therefore, the Defendant Appellees respectfully request that 
this court dismiss Plaintiff's appeal and affirm the Order of the 
Court below pursuant to the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
DATED this §4h day of November, 1990. 
LUND & ASSOCIATES 
J . Lui 
A t t ^ n e y f|c 
Defendants/Appellees 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certifjhthat I caused to be mailed, first-class postage-
prepaid, ^ SS8£ true and correct photocopies of the foregoing 
APPELLEES' BRIEF to Alvin G. Nash, Uintah County Attorney, 
Attorney for the Plaintiff/Appellant, 152 East 100 North, 
Vernal, Utah 84078. 
DATED this -5%h day of November 1990. 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OK UIN'J'AH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OK UTAH, ) 
) 
PLAINTIFF, ) R EPORTER f S TRANSCR J PT 
) OF COURT'S RULING 
vs. ) civiJ, NO. 8qcv-au7u 
) 
) 
) 
JIMMIEN. REIDHEAD, ETAL,, ) C E R T I F I E D C O P Y 
DEFENDANTS. ) 
) 
BE JT REMEMBERED, THAT ON APRIL IJ, ly^U, THE 
ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE COURTROOM 
OF THE UINTAH COUNTY COURTHOUSE, VERNAL, UTAH; SAID CAUSE 
BEING HEARD BY 'I'HE HONORABLE DENNIS L. DRANEY, JUDGE IN 
THE EIGHTH JUDICJAL DISTRJCT, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
A H £ E A R A N C E S 
FOR 'I'HE STATE: ALV I N G. NASH, ESQ. 
UINTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
152 EAST JLUU NORTH 
VERNAL, UTAH 84u7« 
FOR THE DEFENDANTS: LYNN J. LUND, ESQ. AND 
DAVID S. STEED, ESQ. 
UTAH LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TRUST 
230 SOUTH 5UU EAST, tf2IU 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84 IU2 
P R O C E E D T N G S 
* * * 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. 
THE COURT: THE COURT RULES AS FOLLOWS: FIRST 
THE QUESTION HEFORE THE COURT IS NOT WHAT -- WHETHER 
THIS ROAD IS DEDICATED. IT IS NOT WHAT OTHER PEOPLE 
THINK ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE ROAD. THE OUESTLON BEFORE 
THE COURT IS WHETHER THE COMMISSIONERS ACTED IN GOOD 
FAITH, AND WE GET TO THAT POINT ONLY BY A TORTURED 
EXTENSTON OF LANGUAGE OF THE COMPLAINT. THERE IS NO 
ALLEGATION AS TO FRAUD OR CORRUPTION. AT BEST WE HAVE 
THE LANGUAGE PREVIOUSLY CTTED BY THE COURT "AND NOT 
PERFORMED IN GOOD FAITH" FROM PARAGRAPH 9 OF THE 
COMPLAINT. THE COURT FINDS THAT THAT IS INSUFFICIENT 
PI.HADING TO PLEAD BAD FATTH. EVEN IF WE BY SOME 
ARGUMENT CLAIMED THAT THAT WAS DECTDED, THAT THAT WAS 
SUFFJCTENT TO ALLEGE BAD FAITH, THERE JS NOTHING BEFORE 
THE (OURT UPON WHTCH THE COURT BELIEVES AS A TRLER OF 
FACT COULD FIND BAD FATTH ON THE PART OF THE COMMISSION-
ERS. THERE IS NO EVTDENCE BY AFFIDAVIT OR DEPOSITION 
THAT THE COMM\SS I ONERS DID NOT DO WHAT THEY SAID THEY 
DTD PR TOR TO THE DECISION BETNG MADE UNDER WHICH THIS 
ACTION WAS TAKEN. 
1. 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
\i) 
II 
12 
1.1 
U 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
W 
n 
K i 
M 
J5 
THE PLAINTIFF HAS FILED TWO AFFIDAVITS ABOUT 
INDIVIDUAL OPINIONS REGARDING THE STATUS OF THAT ROAD. 
THE COURT FINDS THAT THOSE AFFIDAVITS HAVE NO BEARING ON 
THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT, BECAUSE WHAT THOSE PEOPLE 
THOUGHT OR ANY OTHER PEOPLE EXPRESSED AS TO WHETHER THAT 
MAKES THAT A PUBLIC ROAD OR NOT HAS NO BEARING JN THE 
MATTER BEFORE THE COURT. 
THE COURT HAS EXTENDED TO THE PLAINTIFF AN 
EXTRAORDINARY AMOUNT OF TIME UNDER WHJCH TO PURSUE HIS 
CONCERNS ABOUT THE ACTIONS OF THE COUNTY COMMISSION IN 
THIS CASE. THE COURT WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED IN RESPONSE 
TO THE MOTION OF THE PLAINTIFF FOR A MORE EXPEDITED 
HEARING WHEN THE PLAINTIFF SAID THAT IT'WAS NECESSARY TO 
HAVE EXTENSIVE DISCOVERY TN ORDER FOR THE PLAINTIFF TO 
SUBSTJANTJATE THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT. THAT 
CAUSES ME GRAVE CONCERN ABOUT THE BASIS UPON WHICH THE 
COMPLAINT WAS BROUGHT SH THE FIRST PLACE. 
THE COURT FURTHER RULES THAT WHETHER OR NOT MR 
REIUHEAD OR ANY OTHER COMMISSIONER WAS BENEFITED BY THE 
ACTION IS NOT THE POINT. COMMISSIONERS AND OTHER PUBLIC 
OFFICIALS ARE NOT PROHIBITED FROM DOING THINGS WHICH 
ACCRUE TO THEIR BENEFIT. THE LAW REQUIRES WHEN THEY DO 
THOSE THLNGS THEY DO THEM IN GOOD FAITH. THEY DO THEM 
WITHOUT FRAUD OR WITHOUT CORRUPTION. THAT THEY DO THEM 
1U ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF LAW. 
I 
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MR. BIOELOW'S DEPOSITION WHKN UK WAS ASKKI) WAS 
THKRK ANYTHING DTFFERENT ABOUT THIS ROAD MR. HTGFLOW 
SAID, "YES, THKRK WAS. BECAUSE WK HAVK NKVKR HA!) A ROAD 
WHKKK I WAS AS CAUTTOUS AND AS CARFFUL ABOUT MAKING SURK 
THAT THIS WAS A PUBLIC ROAD." AND THAT DEPOSITION IS 
CI.WAR THAT EXTENSIVE EFFORTS WF.RF MADK TO SKK TO IT THAT 
IN FACT I~T WAS A PUBLIC ROAD OR THAT THKY BKLIKVKD THAT 
IT WAS. AMD THK QUESTION OMCK AGAIN IS NOT WHKTHKR JT 
WAS A PUBLTC ROAD, BUT WHETHER THKSE COMM[SSTONERS 
BKLIKVKD AT THK TIME THK DECISION WAS MADK THAT IT WAS A 
PUBLIC ROAD. AND THK COURT NOTES WITH PLEASURE THAT A 
GREAT DEAL OF EFFORT WAS MADE BY THE COMMISSION AS A 
WHOLE AND BY MR. BIGELOW PARTICULARLY TO SEE TO IT THAT 
HK WAS WKLL FOUNDED IN THE DECISION THAT HE MADE. IN THE 
COURT'S MIND THERE ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT UPON 
WHICH THK PRAYKR OF THE COMPLAINT OF THE PLAINTIFF COULD 
BE GRANTED. 
ADDTT1ONALLY THE COURT FINDS THAT THE 
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED, THE 
COMPLAI NT IS DISMISSED. 
THK COURT WILL RECEIVE SUCH FURTHER 
INFORMATION, MR. LUND, AS YOU BELIEVE BY EVIDENCE OR 
PLEADINGS WILL BEAR UPON THE QUESTION THAT YOU HAVE 
RAISED IN WHICH YOU HAVE REOUESTEU SANCTIONS AGALNST THE 
COMPUTER ASSISTED TRANSCRIPT 
PLAINTIFF. THR RULRS — THK BURDEN UNURR RULE II IS 
SUBSTANT I Alif AS YOU KNOW, AMU THR COURT VII J.I. RECKLVR 
SUCH OTHKR ARGUMRNT OR RV3DRNCE ON THAT POINT AS YOU MAY 
DRRM APPROPRIATR. AMD, OF COURSR, THR P I.A INT1FF CAN 
RRSPONI). 
MR. J.UNI): THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
THR COURT: I'M. ASK MR. LUND THAT YOU PRRPARR 
SUCH FINAL UOCUMRNTS AS ARR MRCRSSARY FOP, I) I SPOS ITI ON 
OF THIS CASK BASRI) ON MY RULING TODAY. 
MR. I.UMI): WK WILL DO THAT, YOUR HONOR. 
THR COURT: ALL RIGHT. ANY OTHER MATTRRS TO 
COMK BRFORR THR COURT ON THIS CASE? IF NOT WR WILL BR 
IN RRCRSS. 
(WHRRRUPON THR RULING OF THR COURT WAS 
CONCLUURU. ) 
* * * 
REPORTER'S CERTJ FICATE 
T, MJLO N. HARMON, RPR, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
[N THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL HI STRICT, STATE OF UTAH, DO HEREBY 
CERT I FY THAT THE ABOVE AMD FOREGOLNG PROCEEDINGS WERE BY 
ME STENOGRAPH I CAI,I,Y REPORTED AT THE TIMES AND PLACES 
HEREIN SET FORTH; THAT THE SAME WAS SUBSEQUENTLY BY ME 
CAUSED TO BE REDUCED TO TYPEWRJTTEN FORM CONSISTING OF 
PAGES y THROUGH 5 ROTH INCLUSIVE; AND THAT THE SAME 
CONSTITUTES A TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS HAD IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CAUSE. 
TO WHICH CERT IFJCAT I ON I HEREBY SET MY HAND 
TH MAY, hVl), AT VERNAL, UTAH 
sjL6k^-J^-*^^ 
MTLO N. HARMON, CSR 
REGISTERED PROFESSJONAL REPORTER 
(UTAH CSR NO. 5J) 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES 
AUGUST I , Iy9 J 
STIPULATION 
This agreement and! stipulation, entered into this 26th day 
of October, 1989, among Alvin Nash, Uintah County Attorney, 
hereinafter "County Attorney", the Uintah County Commissioners, 
hereinafter "Commissioners", and the Uintah County Road Crew 
Employees, hereinafter "Employees", is entered into for the 
purpose of resolving the conflict that exists among these parties 
which has led to the layoff of said employees. 
WHEREAS, the County Attorney recently filed a lawsuit against 
Commissioners for "illegally" paving an undedicated road 
within the County; and, 
WHEREAS, a determination was made by the County Recorders Office 
that ninety seven (97) percent of the Uintah County 
Roads have not been dedicated; and, 
WHEREAS, no one to this date has been able to pinpoint the exact 
roads within the County that have been dedicated; and, 
WHEREAS, the Commissioners were advised by their legal counsel 
that the County Employees could not work on any of the 
undedicated roads within the County without exposing 
themselves and the County to severe liability; and, 
WHEREAS, the County Commissioners laid off the said employees 
until this matter could be resolved; and, 
WHEREAS, employees hired an attorney to represent them and said 
attorney drafted legal papers to file a "class action" 
lawsuit against the Commissioners; and, 
WHEREAS, said papers»gave Commissioners until 5:00 p.m., October 
24, 1989 to put said employees back to work with full 
back pay, seniority, and benefits, or the class action 
suit would be filed; and, 
WHEREAS, the potential plaintiff employees and their legal 
counsel, the Commissioners and their legal counsel and 
the County Attorney all met at a closed session 
Commission meeting on October 24, 1989 to resolve this 
matter; and, 
i i i i v <' 
NOW THEREFORE, all of the parties 
following conditions: 
agree and stipulate to the 
1. All laid off employees will return to work on Friday October 
27, 1989. 
2. Based upon the recommendation of the County Attorney, the 
County Commissioners hereby approve and authorize that all 
laid off employees will be paid full back pay, seniority, and 
benefits for the seven days they have not worked relating to 
this matter. 
3. No reprisals or retaliation shall be taken by the County 
Commissioners or road department supervisors against any 
County Road Employee for having been involved in the threat of 
the Class Action lawsuit. 
4. Based upon the recommendation of the County Attorney, the 
County Commissioners hereby approve and authorize that all 
County Road Employees may pave, or do any type of maintenance 
or road repair work that would fall within the scope and 
duties of their regular employment, under the direction of the 
County Commissioners, upon any undedicated road within the 
County without fear of another lawsuit or any legal or 
administrative action being taken against them or the 
Commissioners by the County Attorney, or anyone within or 
associated with the County Attorney or his office staff. 
5. The present lawsuit, filed by the County Attorney, number 
89-CU-207-U, will remain active and move forward to resolution 
either by future settlement negotiations or by litigation in 
the State Court. 
6. County Employees through their counsel, hereby agree that this 
istipulation settles any and all disputes with the County and 
County Commission arising out of the layoffs that are the 
subject of the demand letter filed with the Commission on 
October 20,*1989. 
SIGNAT 
Harry HV Sotivall; Attorney 
for 4tfnployees 
Reidhead, Chairman A/Jimraie N. ei , ] 
Qc/„ yd^L IM^JL 
fl. Glen McKee Lynn J A Lund 
for Coloraissi 
Lynn J. Lund 
Attorney for Defendants 
230 South 500 East, #210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 355-5609 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
UINTAH COUNTY, : 
P l a i n t i f f , : R U L I N G 
- v s -
Civil No. 89 CV 207 U 
JIMMY N. REIDHEAD, et al., : 
Dennis L. Draney, Judge 
Defendants. : 
This matter came regularly before the Court for hearing in 
the courtroom of the Uintah County Courthouse on April 11, 1990 
on Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court, having 
first read the Motion, the Memoranda supporting and opposing the 
Motion and all the other materials submitted by the parties, and 
having heard argument by counsel and being fully advised in the 
premises, makes the following Ruling: 
RULING 
This is a civil action brought by the Uintah County Attorney 
against the individual members of the Uintah County Commission in 
their personal capacities pursuant to Section 17-5-12, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953. The action seeks the recovery of money and labor 
alleged to have been expended to pave a road because one of the 
Commissioners and his family are the only persons living on the 
portion of the road that was paved. 
The issue to be decided by this Court is whether the Uintah 
County Commissioners acted in good faith, not whether the road is 
dedicated or what other people may think about the road's status. 
The Complaint contains no allegation of fraud or corruption. The 
Court finds that, without more, the Complaint's language "and not 
performed in good faith," at paragraph 9 thereof, is insufficient 
to plead the requisite bad faith. 
Whether or not Mr. Reidhead,'or any other Commissioner, was 
benefited is not at issue because commissioners and other public 
officials are not prohibited from doing things which accrue to 
their benefit. The law requires that when public officials act, 
they must act in good faith, without fraud or corruption, and in 
accordance with the requirements of the law. 
Mr. Bigelow's deposition states that extensive efforts were 
made to ensure that the road being paving was a public road and 
that the County Commission believed that it was. The issue here 
is not whether the road was actually a public road, but whether 
these Commissioners believed that it was. A great deal of effort 
was made by the County Commission as a whole, and by Mr. Bigelow 
in particular, to see that the decision was well founded. 
Even if the allegations of the Complaint were sufficient to 
allege bad faith, nothing before the Court would justify a trier 
of fact could find bad faith on the part of the Commissioners. 
There is no evidence by affidavit or deposition that the Uintah 
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County Commissioners did not do what they said they did prior to 
deciding to pave the road. The Court finds that the affidavits 
filed by the Plaintiff about individual opinions regarding the 
status of the road have no bearing on the issue before the Court. 
The Court has extended an extraordinary amount of time for 
the Plaintiff to pursue his concerns regarding the actions of the 
County Commission in this matter. The Court is deeply concerned 
about the basis upon which the Complaint was brought in the first 
place and that the Plaintiff thought it necessary to do extensive 
discovery to substantiate the allegations of the Complaint. 
The Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material 
fact upon which the prayer of the Plaintiff's Complaint could be 
granted. Therefore, the Court finds that the Defendants are 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Counsel for Defendants shall prepare an appropriate order 
reflecting this ruling. 
Dated this day of , 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
Dennis L. Draney 
District Court Judge 
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Lynn J. Lund 
Attorney for Defendants 
230 South 500 East, #210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 355-5609 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
UINTAH COUNTY, : 
P l a i n t i f f , : O R D E R 
- v s -
Civil No. 89 CV 207 U 
JIMMY N. REIDHEAD, et al., : 
Dennis L. Draney, uudge 
Defendants. : 
This matter came regularly before the Court for hearing in 
the courtroom of the Uintah County Courthouse on April 11, 1990 
on Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court, having 
first read the Motion, the Memoranda supporting and opposing the 
Motion and all the other materials submitted by the parties, and 
having heard argument by counsel and being fully advised in the 
premises, makes the following Order;: 
ORDER 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and this 
action is dismissed with prejudice against all named Defendants. 
Dated this day of , 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
Dennis L. Draney 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that the foregoing RULING and ORDER were drafted 
the day following receipt of a certified copy of the Reporter's 
transcript of the Court's Ruling and I caused a true and correct 
photocopy of the Ruling and Order to Plaintiff's Counsel listed 
below, for his approval and signature, on this 30th day of May, 
1990. 
Alvin G. Nash, Esq. 
Uintah County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
152 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Lynn J. Lund 
Attorney for Defendants 
Approved as to form: 
Alvin G. Nash 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
ALVIN G. NASH #2364 
Uintah County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
152 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (801) 781-0770 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF UINTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
UINTAH COUNTY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JIMMIE N. REIDHEAD, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE 
SUPREME COURT 
CASE NO. 8908000207 
Notice is hereby given that Uintah County, Plaintiff above 
named, hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
from the Summary Judgment entered in this action on the 14th day 
of June, 1990. 
DATED t h i s 5~ .Hi- day of J u l y , 1990. 
(ALVrN'G." NASH' 
TJintah County At torney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, or hand delivered, a copy of the foregoing Order to: 
Lynn J. Lund, Attorney for Defendants and Respondents, Utah Local 
Governments Trust, 230 South 500 East, #210, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84102. 
DATED this £^~ day of July, 1990. 
1 Ctultfl GSUJ^ frrr)pW 
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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
332 STATE CAPITOL 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 
September 13, 1990 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Lynn J. Lund, Esq. 
Utah Local Governments Trust 
230 South 500 East, #210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Uintah County, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. No. 900335 
Jimmie N. Reidhead, et al., 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in this Court, this case 
is poured-over to the Court of Appeals for disposition. 
All further pleadings and correspondence should be directed to 
that Court. The address is 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84102. 
Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk 
